Conclusion BANK IRREVOCABLE living trusts accept only cash, but you can place any kind of asset in an expanded irrevocable living trust—real estate, cash, stock, bonds, works of art. Unless your car is a certified antique which will fetch hundreds of thousands of dollars on the antique car market, do not place your beloved but rusty old chariot into the trust, or that piece of costume jewelry that has sentimental value for you because it was your husband’s first gift to you when you were both impecunious high school students.
Daley permitting them to live in the condominium, which they did for six years, when Mr. E.2d 390, 2009) to the effect that: "If a Medicaid applicant can use and occupy her home as a life tenant, then her home is 'available.'" While this is a misunderstanding of the decision, the court then makes the leap that would seem to invalidate all life estate deeds, which Mass Health has never in fact challenged to date: This court concludes that Mr. Daley's condominium was available to them because they retained life estates under the deed, and continued to use and live in it after establishing the Trust.
On appeal, the Court upholds Mass Health's denial stating that it must give deference to Mass Health's interpretation of its own laws and regulations. Then the Court reviews certain provisions in the trust which permit the trustees to use income and principal to pay certain trust expenses -- taxes, insurance premiums -- and a right of substitution to conclude that "the Daleys had access to both the Trust principal and income." The right of substitution is included in many trusts holding real estate for tax purposes.
In most cases where these trusts own real estate, the right is totally theoretical since the grantors do not have sufficient other assets to make the exchange.
The Court then rejects explicit language in the trust stating that “[t]he Trustee shall have no authority or discretion to distribute principal of the Trust to or for the benefit of either Donor," citing the , the Court actually explains why it should be distinguished from the Daley trust: This case is analogous to Doherty, where the Appeals Court concluded the trust's principal was a countable asset because the trust, despite some language restricting the grantor's access to the principal, allowed the trustees to invade the trust's principal and income when necessary to ensure the grantor's “quality of life,” “comfort,” and “respond to her changing life needs.” The Daley trust apparently has no language permitting access to principal to ensure the Daleys' "quality of life," "comfort," or "changing needs." The trust in had a number of flaws that made it vulnerable to attack by Mass Health.
It permits the trust grantors to exchange property of equal value to the trust property, in effect to buy it out.
This is no different from trustees selling trust property on the open market, except that it gives the grantors the right to demand that this happen.
Code, 17200), for a declaration that defendants predeceased the decedent (§259, subd.
(a)), for imposition of a constructive trust, and for damages.
[¶] (b) The duties of the trustee are owed to the person holding the power to revoke.” The limitation placed on the rights of a beneficiary by section 15800 is consistent with the principle that [p]roperty transferred into a revocable inter vivos trust is considered the property of the settlor for the settlor’s lifetime,and thus, the beneficiaries interest in that property is merely potential and can evaporate in a moment at the whim of the [settlor].